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Since new rules on labour migration came into force in 2008, Sweden’s 
migration policy has been recognized as the most liberal among 
Western countries with regard to integration areas (see MIPEX 
III). The Swedish institutional framework for integration involves 
different actors, belonging to both institutional structures and civil 
society; relies on a diversified set of policies and administrative 
tools targeting different dimensions of immigrant integration; and 
is implemented at both the national and local levels. However, inte-
gration and diversity are prominent problems on Sweden’s political 
and public agendas, especially with regard to the labour market and 
education. These issues are also evident for the immigrant groups 
that are the subject of this report, namely immigrants born in Iran 
and Turkey. 
INTERACT
February 2015 
2015/04
2 ■  Migration Policy Centre - INTERACT ■ February 2015
The following table summarizes their levels of inte-
gration according to the INTERACT Index:
Table 1. INTERACT Integration Index for 
Sweden: Iranian vs. Turkish immigrants
Iranian 
immigrants
Turkish 
immigrants
Labour Market 
Integration 
Index
0.59 0.51
Education 
Integration 
Index
0.34 0.17
Citizenship 
Integration 
Index
0.82 0.90
Source: Di Bartolomeo, Kalantaryan and Bonfanti (2015)
The overall scenario of integration appears tangled 
and complex. If we consider the citizenship dimen-
sion, both groups seem well integrated into the host 
society. However, the scores concerning education 
and the labour market highlight significant diffi-
culties. Why is this? How can this be possible in 
Sweden, a country known for its ‘openness’ to immi-
grants and for being at the cutting edge of progres-
sive integration policies? More generally, how best 
can we explain the integration process of Iranian and 
Turkish immigrants in Sweden? 
This report tries to answer these questions following 
the INTERACT theoretical framework, which 
focuses on the complex network of ties linking insti-
tutional actors in the country of origin and country 
of destination together. The INTERACT frame-
work pays special attention to the role played by the 
former, which will be labelled ‘the origin effect’. 
Figure 1. The impact of ties between institutional 
actors on migrant integration in Sweden 
The picture above outlines the network of institu-
tional ties between destination and origin coun-
tries with respect to the immigrant groups that are 
included in this report. The differences are obvious 
and clear-cut. Turkish migrants are able to call upon 
an extensive network of actors situated within both 
the state and civil society of their country of origin. 
Their actions are complemented by those of other 
actors in the country of destination, with which 
the country of origin is often linked by agreement 
or practice. In contrast, Iranian migrants rely on a 
much smaller network comprised primarily of civil 
society organizations. The attitude of Iranian policy-
makers toward emigrants oscillates between hostility 
and indifference, resulting in the lack of a concrete 
policy framework that addresses emigrants and the 
diaspora community. Such differences between these 
states of origin are illustrated in the following table, 
which summarizes the respective systems of legal 
and political measures targeting emigrants.
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Table 2. State-level framework of emigration/
diaspora policies: Iran vs. Turkey 
Turkey Iran
Legal framework 
for emigrants/
diaspora
Formal and 
organized structure
No formal structure
Approach 
towards 
emigrants
Control, protection 
and empowerment 
of diaspora
Indifference (feeble 
recognition of 
diaspora)
Main state-actors
Prime Ministry 
Presidency for 
Turks Abroad 
and Relative 
Communities
Advisory 
Committee for 
Turkish Citizens 
Living Abroad 
High Committee 
for Turkish Citizens 
Living Abroad 
High Council of 
Iranian Affairs 
Abroad
Socio-economic 
rights
Blue Card 
Bilateral agreement 
in force with 
Sweden
Retirement plan 
ensured in special 
cases
Political rights
Right to vote 
in presidential 
elections, general 
elections and 
referendums
Right to vote in 
general elections
Language and 
cultural rights
Cultural 
programmes and 
language courses. 
Turkish teachers 
sent abroad.
Informal support 
for the preservation 
of an Islamic 
identity abroad.
Dual citizenship 
Actively supported 
as a tool for 
integration abroad
Formally forbidden, 
but increasingly 
tolerated informally
Despite these differences, both immigrant groups 
rely on a large network of associations and organiza-
tions operating in both Sweden and the origin coun-
tries. Yet, if on the one hand associations targeting 
Turkish emigrants in Sweden work in line with 
Ankara, those addressing Iranians abroad tend to 
operate precisely in opposition to the central govern-
ment (see Figure 1).
Given this discrepancy, it is possible to envisage 
some lines of interpretation in order to understand 
the index scores and, more generally, to clarify the 
integration dynamics of Iranian and Turkish immi-
grants in Sweden. For clarity of explanation, the anal-
ysis will be divided according to the index’s dimen-
sions: citizenship, work and education. Finally, some 
concluding remarks concerning the ‘origin effect’ are 
provided.  
Citizenship
According to the citizenship index scores, both 
groups appear highly integrated with regard to the 
nationality dimension. Every year, on average, 1,700 
Swedish passports are given to people born in Iran 
and to those born in Turkey. Based on the evidence 
provided by qualitative surveys, it is reasonable to 
assume that states of origin have a significant ‘origin 
effect’. As regards Turkish immigrants, the legalisa-
tion of dual citizenship in 1981 and new policy goals 
pursued by policymakers in the last decades have 
had a positive impact on the naturalization process. 
It is also possible to speak of an ‘origin effect’ with 
regard to Iranians, even if it follows a different logic. 
Most emigrants who left the country in the 1980s, 
as well as in recent years, did so in order to escape 
the theocratic regime ushered in by the 1979 Revolu-
tion. In these cases, the decision to acquire Swedish 
nationality represents a rupture with the past and 
with the origin state. This difference concerning the 
nature and logic of the ‘origin effect’ is confirmed by 
data regarding onward migration: both Turkish and 
Iranian immigrants present high rates of onward 
migration. However while the former tend to return 
to their home country, the latter are inclined to move 
onward to other Western countries (Klinthäll 2006, 
Kelly 2013). 
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Labour market
Despite average scores for both groups with regard 
to the labour market integration index, the unem-
ployment rates are especially worrying: 15.4% and 
15.6%, respectively, for Turkish and Iranian immi-
grants. This is far higher than the unemployment 
rate for Swedish natives, which was approximately 
4.3% in 2014. Given the scarcity of data and infor-
mation, it is difficult to estimate an ‘origin effect’ as 
regards integration in the labour market. However 
according to the literature, it is possible to point 
out different potential drivers of integration for 
the groups examined. For Turkish immigrants, it is 
reasonable to assume a lack of human capital due 
to the low average level of education of this popula-
tion. The same cannot be said for Iranians who, on 
the contrary, represent the foreign-born community 
with the highest share of tertiary-educated individ-
uals (even higher than Swedish natives). As pointed 
out by Kelly (2013), an individual factor related to 
status can come into play in this case. Following the 
author’s explanation, it is reasonable to think that 
many of the tertiary-educated Iranians living in 
Sweden prefer to take advantage of benefits granted 
by the Swedish welfare system than accept low-
skilled jobs.
Education
Integration problems are even more pronounced in 
education than in the labour market, particularly for 
Turkish immigrants. The difference between index 
scores – 0.34 for Iranians and 0.17 for Turkish immi-
grants – might be explained on the basis of the afore-
mentioned difference in educational levels. Another 
key impediment to integration in this area is surely 
the lack of an agreement between the countries of 
origin and destination regarding the recognition of 
educational qualifications.
That said, it is difficult to come up with a clear picture 
concerning the ‘origin effect’ in this corridor, given 
the scarcity of data and the lack of relevant informa-
tion in the literature. The result of such an effect is 
ambiguous and strictly related to the actors involved, 
the relations among them, and the historic migra-
tory profile of each group. As regards Iranian immi-
grants, if on the one hand civil society organizations 
represent a positive factor, on the other hand the 
central government represents a concrete obstacle 
for integration in the host country (as pointed out 
by qualitative surveys). In-depth interviews high-
light the ‘obstructionist’ approach followed by the 
Teheran government, which seems to take advan-
tage of difficulties experienced by Iranians residing 
in Sweden in order to promote nationalistic senti-
ment abroad.
The Turkish case is different. It is characterized by 
a substantial merging of central administration 
and organizational interests: both of which aim to 
promote integration in the countries of destination 
and strengthen ties with the diaspora community. 
Still, even in this case, it is difficult to identify a 
single or clear  ‘origin effect’. One the one hand, the 
policy framework issued by the Turkish government 
favours the socio-economic integration of emigrants 
into the host society. On the other, it maintains a 
staunch defense of Turkish culture and language 
abroad (Bilgili and Siegel 2011), suggesting that 
current and past administrations see distinct limits 
regarding ‘how much’ integration is desirable. 
5 ■  Corridor Report on Sweden: the case of Iranian and Turkish immigrants
References
Bilgili, O. Siegel, M. 2011. Understanding the 
changing role of the Turkish diaspora, UNU-MERIT 
Working Paper Series, 2011/039.
Di Bartolomeo, A. Kalantaryan, S. Bonfanti, S. 2015. 
Measuring Integration of Migrants: A Multivariate 
Approach, INTERACT RR 2015/01, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di 
Fiesole (FI): European University Institute.
Kelly, M. 2013, Onward Migration: The Transna-
tional Trajectories of Iranians Leaving Sweden, 
Thesis (PhD), Uppsala Universitet. 
Klinthäll,  M.  2006. Immigration, Integration and 
Return Migration, Paper presented to the Interna-
tional Symposium on International Migration And 
Development , Turin, 28-30 June.
Content © Authors, 2015
© European University Institute, 2015
6 ■  Migration Policy Centre - INTERACT ■ February 2015
INTERACT
Researching Third Country Nationals’ Integration as a Three-way Process - Immigrants, Countries of 
Emigration and Countries of Immigration as Actors of Integration
The INTERACT project studies the impact of sending countries on migrant integration. It looks at 
the ways in which institutions and organisations in origin countries thicken transnational bonds by 
developing tools to boost financial transfers, maintain cultural heritages, enhance migrant political 
participation, and protect migrants’ rights. It seeks to understand how these efforts impact migrant 
integration, as well as how origin country policies complement or contradict the integration measures 
of receiving country governments.
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